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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of property
obtained by unlawful conduct, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to

sustain defendant's conviction for property obtained by unlawful
conduct?

This Court will not reverse a jury conviction for

insufficient evidence unless the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, are sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accord State

2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in its

in truction to the jury on the elements of the offense charged?
This is a matter of discretion, reviewable only for prejudical
error.

State v. Lopezf 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);

State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Martin Hernandez, was charged with one count
of property obtained by unlawful conduct, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1990) (Record
[hereinafter R.] at 13)• On September 13, 1990, a jury trial
commenced in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County,
Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding (R. 51). The same
day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 86).
Defendant waived time for sentencing, requesting immediate
imposition of sentence (Transcript of Trial, September 13, 1990
[hereinafter T.] at 176-77).

Defendant was sentenced to the

statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years, to run
consecutively with any other sentences defendant was then serving
(R. 87, 104-05; T. 178).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Martin Hernandez, a convicted felon, has
been housed in the Iron County-Utah State Correctional Facility
in Cedar City, Utah, from approximately July 1989 to the present

(T. 39-50, 98-103, 126). While in the Iron County facility,
defendant, and several other inmates, became involved in a series
of fraudulent credit card transactions (T. 116-118).

Inmates

perpetrating the credit card scam phone ordered merchandise using
valid, unissued American Express Credit Card numbers (T. 58-61,
75, 116).
In approximately July-August 1989, defendant approached
John Maycockf an inmate directly involved in obtaining the
unissued credit card numbers, and requested that Maycock order
some merchandise for him (T. 92, 101, 117-18, 126). Defendant
threatened Maycock with "some type of violence" if :he refused to
place his order (T. 117). Subsequently, in approximately August
1989, Aleta Bowman, a property officer

at the Iron County

facility, received merchandise from ZCMI and Collett's addressed
to several inmates, including defendant (T. 42). Upon its
arrival at the facility, the merchandise was seized and kept in
the evidence room pursuant to an investigation of the credit card
scam (T. 42)•
On November 8, 1989, Officer Bowman called together the
inmates to whom the seized merchandise was addressed, including
defendant, and informed them that the property was under
investigation for credit card fraud (T. 43-44).

She further

informed the inmates that they could either sign for and receive
the property, or not sign for it, in which case they would not
receive the property (T. 43-45).

Defendant was among those

As a property officer, it was Bowman's responsibility to
search, receipt and deliver incoming property to the inmates (T.
39).

choosing to sign a property receipt for the merchandise addressed
to him which stated "Inmate assumes sole responsibility for
property listed" (T. 44; R. 82, a copy of property receipt signed
2
by defendant is attached hereto as Addendum A).
Because the
merchandise had been seized for investigation/ defendant was not
allowed to take physical possesion of the property for which he
3
had signed (T. 42).
Shortly after the present charge was filed against him,
defendant approached Edward Monteiro in approximately May 1990,
and asked him to testify falsely that Maycock had told him that
he (Maycock) had ordered the merchandise without defendant's
knowledge (T. 89-90, 102-03).

In exchange for Monteiro's

favorable testimony, defendant promised that he would clear
Monteiro's "rat jacket" (T. 90-102).

Monteiro refused to comply

with defendant's request (T. 90-102).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial, together with all
reaonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendant's
conviction for property obtained by unlawful conduct.

Further,

the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the requisite
2
Property listed on the receipt signed by defendant included:
one pair of Nike Air athletic shoes, one Sharp stereo, and one
Sony Walkman with headphones (R. 82; see Addendum A ) .
3
The Sharp stereo defendant signed for would not have been
delivered to him even if it had not been seized pursuant to the
investigation because compact disc stereos are not allowed in the
facility (T. 51-52). Inmates who receive property that cannot be
used in the facility are allowed to issue a release form to have
the property transferred to family members (T. 52). Defendant
told another inmate, Edward Monteiro, that he didn't care whether
the stereo he had ordered was approved or not because he could
send it home (T. 7).

elements of the offense which properly included a constructive
theory of receipt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY CONCERNING
THE ELEMENT OF RECEIPT,
Defendant asserts that evidence adduced at trial is
insufficient to establish that he unlawfully "received, retained,
concealed, possessed, or disposed" of property within the meaning
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1990)5 (Brief of Appellant
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 3).
A.

The Evidence Adduced at Trial is Sufficient to
Establish Defendant's Constructive Receipt of
Unlawfully Obtained Property.

In reviewing an allegation of insufficient evidence,
this Court views the evidence and the reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and will not
reverse a jury conviction unless the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
4
The State's response to the issues defendant raises on appeal
is condensed in a single point due to the similarity between
defendant's argument in support of his challenge to both the
sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.
5
The statute in full provides:
It is unlawful for any person to receive,
conceal, possess, or dispose of personal
property, cash or other form representing
value, if he knows or has reason to believe
the property, cash, or other form
representing value has been obtained through
unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6506.1, 76-6-506.2, or 76-6-506.3.

have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted.
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).

State v. Johnsonf 774 P.2d

Accord State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134,

137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Turning to the facts established at trial and their
reasonable inferences, defendant does not dispute that he signed
a property receipt for merchandise addressed to him which clearly
stated: "Inmate assumes sole responsibility for property listed"
(Br. of Appp. at 4; T. 44; R. 82, see Addendum A).

Rather,

defendant appears to assert that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4
requires actual physical possession of property and that his act
of signing the property receipt was simply insufficient to
establish that he received or possessed the merchandise within
the meaning of the statute (Br. of App. at 3-4). Because
defendant has not supported his assertion with any legal analysis
or supporting authority, this Court may properly decline to rule
on it.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
Should this Court determine that defendant's bare

assertion provides sufficient grounds for this Court to consider
the merits of his claim, the evidence established at trial is
sufficient to demonstrate that defendant constructively received
the merchandise addressed to him.
Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506 (1990) defines terms
for purposes of financial transaction card offenses, the terms
"receive, retain, conceal, possess, or dispose" are not included
in that section.

In addition, the term "receive" has not

previously been interpreted by either this Court or the Utah

Supreme Court in the specific context of credit card fraud.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that it is no defense
to the offense of obtaining property by unauthorized use of a
credit card to show that the property was ultimately picked up by
a third party.

Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437

(1971) (defendant asserted he had changed his mind about picking
up tires purchased with a proscribed credit card "because he had
been out of prison for four years and wanted to stay out;"
however, he then permitted his wife and another to go pick up the
tires).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (1990).
In the absence of a statutory definition of the term

"receive" in the specific context of financial transaction card
offenses, it is both appropriate and necessary to refer to the
term as it is defined generally in the Criminal Code.

State v.

One Porsche 2-Door, Etc., 526 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1974) (noting
that one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is
that courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject
matter of the statute dealing with the subject) (citations
omitted); Anthony Investment Co. v. Arizona Department of
Economic Security, 132 Ariz. 176, 644 P.2d 912, 915 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1982) (noting that it is a well established rule of
statutory construction that statutes are to be construed together
and that legislative construction of the meaning of certain words
in one act is entitled to consideration in construing the same
words appearing in another act).

Contrary to defendant's

assertion, statutes proscribing offenses against property

encompass a constructive theory of receipt and/or possession.
Specifically, in the theft by receiving statute, "receives" is
defined as "acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property.M Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(3)(a)
(1990).

For purposes of the theft statutes, evidence that the

accused had control over the property, not necessarily physical
possession, is generally sufficient to establish the requisite
receipt or possession element of the offense charged.

Actual

physical possession is not required.

State v. Dyett, 114 Utah

379, 199 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1948).

Accord, State v. Bailey, 94

Or. App. 767, 767 P.2d 114, 115 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (the state
need not prove physical possession in order for a jury to find
that a defendant maintained sufficient control over stolen
property to constitute concealment); State v. Ashby, 77 Wash.2d
33, 459 P.2d 403, 405 (Wash. 1969) ("prevailing rule at common
law and in most jurisdictions is that actual physical possession
is not a requisite of receiving. . . . [i]ntentional control over
the goods by the receiver is sufficient").

See also LaFave &

Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 8.10 at 423-25 (1986) (one may
receive property when one exercises control over it).
In addition to the above statutory definition of
"receives" (which encompasses a contructive theory), the Utah
Supreme Court has applied a constructive theory of possession to
other criminal offenses.

Specifically, the court has not

required actual physical possession in its interpretion of the
Controlled Substances Act holding that "[a]ctual physical
possession is not a required element of the crime of possession

controlled substance.

A finding of constructive possession

uae defendant will satisfy the possession element,
Hansen,
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1988) (actual physical

possess:! on i s i lot a necessary element of the offense of
production of a controlled substance)

Rather than requi

j'

actual physical possession, the court has emphasised the element
•

To prove that a defendant was in knowing and
intentional possession of a controlled
substance, the prosecution need only
establish that the produced contraband was
found in a place or under circumstances
indicating that the accused had the ability
and the intent to exercise dominion and
control over it,
Hansen, 732 P.2d at J 32 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). •
Accord State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d

(Utah 1987),
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property offenses.

the above authority
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present case shows that the evidence of defendant
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receipt of the merchandise is sufficient because It establishes

See Combs, 483 P.2d at 439; Dyett, 199 P.2d at 1 57.
ts

that defendant exerted "dominion and control" over the property.
Defendant clearly claimed ownership of the merchandise and
accepted responsbility for it when he signed the property
receipt.

Jones v. State, 276 Ark. 116, 632 S.W.2d 414 (Ark.

1982) (where property was located in defendant's vehicle, his
claim of ownership provided the necessary element to prove
constructive possession).

Defendant's signature on the receipt

vested him with full responsibility for the property, which was
not available to other inmates, nor could it be disposed of by
facility personnel without defendant's consent (T. 51-52).

Based

on the foregoing, evidence of defendant's constructive receipt of
the merchandise adduced at trial is sufficient to affirm his
conviction for property obtained by unlawful conduct.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury
Concerning the Receipt Element of the Offense.

Concomitant with his challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, defendant asserts that the trial court committed
reversible error in its instruction No. 10 to the jury on the
receipt element of the offense of property obtained by unlawful
7
conduct.
Defendant takes issue with language in the instruction
which states in part: "You are instructed that one may receive,
retain, conceal, possess or dispose of personal property without
having actual physical possession thereof."

In making his

argument, defendant states that the above language is unsupported

The jury was fully advised as to each requisite element of the
offense (R. 74, 75, Jury Instructions No. 9 and 10; copies of
instructions no. 9 and 10 are attached hereto as addendum B ) .

by either Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 or 'U'tah case law (Br. of
App. P* * ) .
il, I i h the exclusive province of the trial court
M1
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction

at,

RESPECTFULLY submitted this £r>' day of February, 1991
PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
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ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you may find Defendant Martin Hernandez guilty of
the offense of Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct as charged in
the Information, the State must prove and you must find,
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each of every one of
the following elements:
1.

That Defendant Martin Hernandez received, retained,
concealed,

possessed, or disposed of personal

property;
2.

That Defendant Martin Hernandez knew or had reason to
believe the property had been obtained by the unlawful
conduct of purchasing or attempting to purchase goods
or property by the use of a false, fictitious, or
fraudulently obtained card number;

3.

That said property had a retail value of $250 or
more; and

4.

That such events occurred on or about November 8,
1989, in Iron County, State of Utah.

If the State has proved each and every one of the foregoing
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt; then
it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Property Obtained
by Unlawful Conduct as charged in the Information.
the State of Utah has failed to prove

However, if

any one or more of the

previously described elements, you must find the Defendant not
guilty of the offense of Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct
as charged in the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO,

\t>

You are instructed that one may receive, retain,
conceal, possess or dispose of personal property without having
actual physical possession thereof.

If you find from the evidence

and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally
exercised dominion or control over the property, or acquired
ownership or title thereto, or placed the property in the possession
of another to be held for defendant's benefit, then you may find
that the defendant received, retained, concealed, possessed or
disposed of personal property even though he never actually touched
that property.

